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Abstract
This article departs from the discussion by Stephen Castles 
on the migration-asylum nexus by focusing on the political 
and cultural effects of the summer of immigration in 2015. 
It argues for a conceptualization of the asylum-migration 
nexus within the framework of Anibal Quijano’s “colo-
niality of power” by developing the analytical framework 
of the “coloniality of migration.” Through the analytical 
framework of the “coloniality of migration” the connection 
between racial capitalism and the asylum-migration nexus 
is explored. It does so by first focusing on the economic and 
political links between asylum and migration, and how 
both constitute each other. On these grounds, it discusses 
how asylum and migration policies produce hierarchical 
categories of migrants and refugees, producing a nomencla-
ture drawing on an imaginary reminiscent of the oriental-
ist and racialized practices of European colonialism and 
imperialism. In a second step, it focuses on migration and 
asylum policies as inherent to a logic of racialization of the 
workforce. It does so by first exploring the racial coding of 
immigration policies within the context of settler colonial-
ism and transatlantic White European migration to the 
Américas and Oceania in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, and second, by discussing migration policies in 
post-1945 Western Europe.
Résumé
Cet article se démarque de la discussion de Stephen Castles 
sur le lien entre l’asile et la migration en ciblant les effets 
politiques et culturels de l’été migratoire vécu en 2015. Il 
plaide pour une conceptualisation du lien entre l’asile et 
la migration dans le cadre de la « colonialité du pouvoir » 
d’Anibal Quijano, et ce en élaborant le cadre d’analyse de 
la « colonialité de la migration ». C’est dans ce dernier qu’il 
explore la connexion entre le capitalisme racial et le lien 
asile-migration. Pour cela, l’article cible d’abord les liens 
politiques et économiques entre asile et migration, et la 
manière dont l’un et l’autre se constituent l’un par l’autre. 
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Sur ces bases, en établissant une nomenclature qui s’appuie 
sur une réminiscence fictive des pratiques orientalistes et 
racialisées du colonialisme et de l’impérialisme européens, il 
discute la manière dont les politiques d’asile et de migration 
produisent des catégories hiérarchiques de migrants et de 
réfugiés. Dans la deuxième partie, l’article cible les politiques 
d’asile et de migration en tant que politiques indissociables 
d’une logique de racialisation de la main d’œuvre. Pour cela, 
il explore tout d’abord le codage des données raciales des 
politiques d’immigration dans le contexte du colonialisme 
de peuplement et de la migration transatlantique des blancs 
d’origine européenne vers les Amériques et l’Océanie aux 
XIXe et XXe siècles ; il discute ensuite des politiques de migra-
tion dans l’Europe de l’Ouest de l’après-1945.
During August and September 2015 the media con-stantly replayed images of refugees traversing the Balkan route to Austria, Germany, Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland, and Norway. This migration was initially 
met with hospitality through Willkommenskultur (welcome 
culture). However, this had changed by autumn 2015 when 
right-wing populists and nationalists blamed Merkel’s gov-
ernment for allowing European societies to be “over-run” by 
Muslim refugees from “archaic” societies. This is exemplified 
in reports of New Year’s Eve in Cologne 2015/16, when North 
African and Muslim men were accused of sexual assaults and 
attacks, portrayed in the media as mainly targeting white 
German women in the main train station.2 This reactivated 
the dichotomy of civilization and barbarity, constructing 
black and brown racialized masculinities as “premodern,” 
lacking control over their sexuality and having a patriarchal, 
misogynist mindset. In political talk shows, experts reiter-
ated that the problem was the poor adjustment of these men 
to the ruling “normative gender order.” Their presence was 
interpreted by right-wing populists as a threat to Occidental 
civility. Politicians reacted quickly to these accusations. On 
July 7, 2016, the law governing sexual offences was amended 
to state that a sexual offence takes place when a woman’s 
non-consent (“no means no”) is not respected and when 
sexual attacks and harassment are committed by a group of 
men. This law could be understood as a slight achievement 
in the struggle against sexual violence. But the underlying 
racism, in particular anti-Muslim racism, which accelerated 
its passing, deserves some attention.
The New Year’s Eve Event 2015/16 initiated a turning point 
in “the conjuncture of racism”3 in Europe. The 2015 summer 
of migration transformed into a “refugee crisis.” The arrival 
of people seeking shelter in Europe started to be publicly 
debated in media and politics as a “crisis,” a destabilization 
of the social norms, and a rupture in the social order. The 
wealthy European countries—Sweden, Finland, Germany, 
and Austria—that took the biggest share of the 1.5 million 
people fleeing the war zones in the Middle East and Africa 
are not experiencing economic crisis. However, the arrival 
of those fleeing wars and political conflicts in the Middle 
East and Africa produced a “crisis” in the normative white 
national population. As Suvi Keskinen4 discusses, in Finland 
this is rather a “crisis” of “white hegemony” played out by 
the reshuffling of “white neonationalist femininities” and 
the underlying hegemonic reconstitution of their masculine 
counterparts.5 Thus, the rhetoric of crisis is constructed on 
an ideological level.
Hall et al.6 discuss the significant role played by the media 
in establishing the hegemony of Thatcher’s authoritarian 
populism in late-1970s Britain. Hall et al. identified the media 
construction of Black Caribbean men as “muggers” as a 
strategy to establish a national consensus for the Conserva-
tive government through the incessant fabrication of news 
on black men attacking white people on the street. This 
consensus was achieved by mobilizing racism. This media 
spectacle reiterated the British Empire’s colonial vocabulary 
of racialization within the metropole and diverted atten-
tion from Thatcher’s dismantling of the welfare state, as 
well as the transformation causing mass unemployment 
and decreasing household incomes among the working and 
middle classes. Instead, the media spectacle contributed to 
the fabrication of an outsider to the nation to whom social 
and economic deprivation as well as feelings of individual 
insecurity were attributed. Thus, the media were key actors 
in the formation of a hegemonic bloc supporting Thatcher’s 
authoritarian populism. On the basis of his analysis of the 
political status quo, Hall7 developed his analysis of the spe-
cific conjuncture and contingency of racism. The spectacle 
of the black man as mugger produced an affective connec-
tion between the population and the government by creating 
“moral panic.” At the same time, the moral panic fuelled the 
government responses to this “crisis” with the introduction 
of police “stop and search” and racial profiling. This con-
nection between media representation, affective connec-
tions, and ideological negotiations represented a contingent 
moment of the specific conjuncture of racism, orchestrated 
by a variety of actors representing a range of convergent and 
divergent financial, economic, and political interests.
In the case of the production of the “refugee crisis” through 
media images, we have a similar convergence of media, affect, 
and politics. As I will develop here, the rhetoric involved 
in the production of the “refugee crisis” resurfaces within 
a specific conjuncture of racism in Europe. As I will argue, 
within this conjuncture colonial legacies of the construc-
tion of the racialized Other are reactivated and wrapped in 
a racist vocabulary, drawing on a racist imaginary combined 
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with new forms of governing the racialized Other through 
migration control. The analysis of the media and political 
spectacle of the “refugee crisis” requires that we consider it 
as an articulation of a contingency of a specific conjuncture 
of racism in Europe, particularly in Germany.
I argue here that contemporary racism in Europe, particu-
larly in Germany, is articulated by the trope of the “refugee” 
and the media’s conjuring up of the “refugee crisis” in public 
and political debates. The “refugee crisis” is symptomatic of 
what Stephen Castles8 has coined the “asylum-migration 
nexus” and operates within the logic of what I will call the 
coloniality of migration following Anibal Quijano’s9 “colo-
niality of power.” In the discussion that follows, I situate the 
asylum-migration nexus at the juncture of the coloniality 
of power and racial capitalism.10 I then extend the analyti-
cal framework of the coloniality of migration by exploring 
settler colonialism, transatlantic white European migration, 
and the racial coding of immigration policies in former 
colonies in the Americas and Oceania in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, as well as migration policies in post-1945 
Western Europe. The article concludes by looking at the value 
of the coloniality of migration as an analytical framework for 
the analysis of the present conjuncture of racism.
Contingency: The “Refugee Crisis” and the 
Migration-Asylum Nexus
By autumn 2015 there were incessant complaints about the 
“waves of refugees invading” Europe, and in particular Ger-
many, in populist and social media. The “refugee crisis” was 
constructed as the result of lack of management by a govern-
ment with no regard for the burden caused by uncontrolled 
migration on state welfare and social housing provision, 
whilst “refugees” were constructed as a threat to social cohe-
sion. Structural inequalities were presented as resulting from 
the arrival of refugees and conflated with racist fantasies of 
Überfremdung (foreignization), a fantasy of loss of national 
identity and culture based on one people, race, ethnicity, 
religion, and language. Thus in German elections in Septem-
ber 2017 these sentiments resulted in an increase in votes for 
the right-wing populist party and the strengthening of right-
wing populist positions in the conservative party, in parts of 
the Social Democrats and die Linke.
The right-wing populist position exposed amnesia about 
inter-European histories of incessant migrations and (anti-)
hegemonic struggles and Europe’s history of colonialism, 
slavery, imperialism, settler colonialism, and transatlantic 
migration. Within the narrative of a monocultural/ethnic/
racial/lingual nation, contemporary refugees—for example, 
Afghans, Somalis, Sudanese, and Syrians—seem to have no 
historical connection with Europe. However, these countries 
were colonized by European nations or have been subjected 
to European imperial powers. Currently, European coun-
tries take part in international negotiations on global trade 
and development in the countries that are home to Europe’s 
refugees. European countries also participate in interna-
tional political and military conflicts as well as in peace 
negotiations. However, the perception of refugees as a “crisis” 
in European media and political debates accentuates the 
refugee presence as a rupture in everyday life.
This perception is accompanied by images of refugees arriv-
ing in Europe. Hyperbolic figures became “facts” mobilized 
in media and political debates on the capacity of an over-
burdened Europe to receive refugees. This legitimized their 
deportation and border closures. A close look at the statistics 
of organizations such as the UNHCR paints a different picture 
of Europe being “overburdened,” because the countries that 
receive the largest numbers of refugees are not in Europe, but 
in Africa and Asia. These countries are Ethiopia, Uganda, Iran, 
Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey.11 UNHCR statistics from 201612 
show that the countries receiving the largest numbers of “per-
sons of concern”13 in Europe were Germany (1.27 million) and 
Sweden (349,303).14 In relation to the total population of these 
countries—Germany 82.67 million and Sweden 10 million15—
“refugee” numbers are a tiny percentage. These figures dem-
onstrate that the contemporary debates on the need to control 
the entry and settlement of “refugees” are not substantiated by 
facts. Rather they are sustained by “moral panic”16 fabricated 
on the basis of racist fantasies about a constructed inferior, 
animalistic, racialized Other. As already mentioned in the 
introduction, Hall et al. discuss the construction of the racial-
ized Other by analyzing the media spectacle of black bodies as 
routinized images in daily news and media outlets. This media 
representation is presented as “factual news.” Yet, as Hall et al. 
show, the media’s visual and textual vocabulary is not neutral, 
but is embedded in historical genealogies of representation, 
fuelled by political and financial interests. In late 1970s Britain, 
as Hall et al. demonstrate, the nation underwent a political 
transformation, resulting in the shrinking of the welfare state 
and the introduction of cuts to state ownership and public 
services. This period of transition from the welfare state to 
the liberal state is the hallmark of Margaret Thatcher’s govern-
ment. As Hall et al. state, as already mentioned, conservative 
tabloids such as the Sun or the Mirror did not draw attention to 
this political change which harmed the working- and middle-
class population. Instead, these tabloids constructed a new fear 
of black Caribbean men, which they portrayed as “muggers.” 
Hall et al.’s analysis shows that the media representation of 
“the black Caribbean man” functioned as a “floating signifier” 
for all kinds of racial fantasies, articulated through the sexual 
and existential fears and anxieties of the white population. 
The state’s response to this spectacle of racist angst was the 
introduction of measures to increase social control through 
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policing and racial profiling. The media representation of 
“mugging” contributed to the social reproduction of a matrix of 
racist differentiation by forging an analogy between crime and 
racialized black and brown masculinities. Through the racist 
conservative media Thatcher garnered support to popularize 
her law-and-order society model by channelling people’s anxi-
eties and fears towards a racist matrix of thinking the exterior-
ity to the nation. The cooperation between politics and media 
resulted in the building of a hegemonic bloc that re-actualized 
racism in contemporary British society. In contemporary 
Europe, the “refugee” has become the “floating signifier.”
Thus within the media rhetoric of the “refugee crisis,” the 
signifier of the “refugee” works as a “floating signifier” repre-
senting the anxieties and fears of what the media conceived as 
the majority of the population, regularly imagined as white, 
German, abled, cis-gendered, national bodies. These anxieties 
and fears of the presumed population are projected onto an 
imagined racialized Other. Further, the link of the “refugee” 
with “crisis” points to the idea of rupture and singularity. As 
Myrto Tsilimpounidi17 notes, “crisis” can be perceived as 
a “perpetual frame-breaking moment that dismantles the 
certainties and normative narratives of nation, sovereignty, 
social bonds and belonging for people on the ground.” “Cri-
sis” involves financial, economic, or political life in dominant 
media and political discourses, but also defines a “state of 
being” in society that results out of a “deep political and social 
sense of uncertainty, precarity, and dispossession.”18 Linked to 
refugees, the media and political rhetoric on “crisis” illustrates 
the continuation of the coloniality of power.
The vilification of the refugee as sexual perpetrator, poten-
tial terrorist, and destroyer of Western democratic values and 
beliefs signals a political shift. This shift is reflected in the 
vocabulary used to describe in cultural, social, legal, and polit-
ical terms the living situation of people fleeing their countries 
due to political persecution,19 war, and other political conflicts. 
In the 1970s, Chileans, Argentinians, and Uruguayans were 
recognized as exiles in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, 
and Spain.20 Today, the term exile has almost disappeared 
from public discourse and has been replaced by asylum poli-
cies and discourses on “bogus asylum seekers.” These policies 
and discourses are characterized by a perspective on asylum 
that undermines the entitlement to sanctuary for persons flee-
ing from violence and persecution. Further, seeking asylum 
is conceived as being related to unique national or regional 
circumstances, unrelated to an entangled history of global 
exploitation, imperial oppression, and capitalist expansion.
As Stephen Castles21 argues, the distinction between asy-
lum as coercion and migration as choice disregards the fact 
that migratory movements are driven by global conflicts, wars, 
political interests, and economic dynamics. The financial cri-
sis in 2007/8, and the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria are 
forcing people to leave the destruction of their homes, neigh-
bourhoods, villages, towns, and cities. Thus, the assumption 
that migration is economic, voluntary, and, as such, not the 
result of conditions that force people to migrate, overlooks 
the global entanglements in which migration occurs. When 
people migrate because of poverty, unemployment, and dep-
rivation, these societal conditions are connected to political 
constellations, very often tied to the exercise of power by 
authoritarian regimes. Thus political or religious persecution 
might interact with economic deprivation and vice versa. The 
analysis by Castles of the “asylum-migration nexus” addresses 
the correlation between asylum and migration. This correla-
tion has been forged further through the increasing restric-
tions imposed on the right to asylum since the 1990s within 
the EU. Asylum has become synonymous with “economic 
migration” because there is an assumption that asylum appli-
cations are being made by potential low-waged migrant work-
ers looking for employment in Europe.
Since the Tampere European Council meeting in October 
1999 and its confirmation through The Hague Program in 
2004, the European Commission has been creating common 
principles and measures for migration and asylum regula-
tions. In October 2008 the European Parliament adopted the 
European Immigration and Asylum Pact establish common 
asylum and migration policies within the EU on four levels:
1. through cooperation with the countries of origin and 
transit in the form of development aid;
2. a common European asylum system, in terms of the 
Geneva Convention and obligations of member states 
under international treaties;
3. integration policies; and
4. a systematic approach to the management of transna-
tional migration movements.
These goals are achieved through a joint visa policy; 
cooperation and exchange of information within a com-
mon data bank; and the creation in 2005 of FRONTEX, a 
common European border patrol. The EU’s aim is to create 
“common asylum procedures and a uniform status for those 
who are granted asylum or subsidiary protection, as well 
as strengthening practical cooperation between national 
asylum administrations and the external dimension of 
asylum.”22 The “external dimension of asylum” is linked to 
the relationship between migration policies and develop-
ment aid. In “Asylum: An Integrated Approach to Protection 
across the EU,” the EU provides financial support to “third 
countries,” which are transit countries for refugees and 
migrants heading to Europe. This affects “transit countries,” 
such as Morocco, which receives funding for the control of 
its borders to Europe, detention camps, and information 
training for immigrants. Thus “transit countries” are them-
selves becoming countries of immigration as the increasing 
Volume 34 Refuge Number 1
20
hurdles in crossing the EU border force people to remain in 
these countries. Migration has been inextricably connected 
to asylum through these developments and the recent 
approach to refugees in Europe. The link between migra-
tion and asylum has been politicized by the erosion of the 
humanitarian aspect of asylum; the tightening of migration 
restrictions; and the economic demand for labour migration. 
Migration is politically regulated through asylum, much as 
the latter is increasingly being regulated by labour migration 
demands. This is the asylum-migration nexus, which has 
been reinforced through increasing securitization since 9/11.
Antonio Negri’s23 analysis of war as an integrative princi-
ple in the formation of the social order (guerra ordinativa24) 
is more relevant than ever. War has become integrated into 
the everyday social order through the development of the 
rhetoric of war outside of physical war zones.25 As such, the 
rhetoric of war is not just “the continuation of politics by 
other means; it becomes the fundamental aspect of politics 
and legitimation.”26 The asylum-migration nexus serves this 
politics of legitimation in three ways. First, it manages the 
collateral damage and victims of global war and conflicts. 
Second, it secures borders when asylum seekers are increas-
ingly treated as invaders. Third, its differentiation of causes, 
patterns, and trajectories of persecution and escape under-
mine the ethical legitimation of asylum as a humanitarian 
resource. Within this context, the definition of countries 
as “safe countries” or “countries of persecution” depends 
increasingly on global political conjunctures and national or 
European political and economic interests.
The categorization of refugees into different statuses 
attached to the process of application and recognition of 
asylum produces a hierarchical order, a nomenclature 
reminiscent of the orientalist and racialized practices of 
European colonialism and imperialism. Asylum is ruled by 
the governance of migration based on a range of economic 
interests and cultural dynamics rooted in the history of the 
production of the racialized Other.27 As Quijano28 asserts, 
European nation-states were established on the basis of a 
racial classification system. Since the nineteenth century, 
this system has been further developed through migration 
regulation and control. From their introduction, migration 
policies were coded through a racist nomenclature in former 
European colonies in North, Central, and South America 
and the Caribbean in the late nineteenth century and in 
Oceania and South Africa in the twentieth century. As such, 
migration policies as devices operating within the logic of 
coloniality have racializing effects.
Conjuncture: Coloniality of Migration
As W. E. B. Du Bois29 noted, modern societies are consti-
tuted through racialization.30 Racism was exported from 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to Europe’s colonized 
and occupied territories and developed further by European 
philosophical and scientific discourses in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries31 As such, racism is the basis of 
the constitution of the world order and the division of the 
world’s population.32 Within this system of racial classifi-
cation that Anibal Quijano33 defines as the “coloniality of 
power,” social categories in ethnicity, indigeneity, race, and 
religion emerged, classifying the population by administra-
tive, legal, scientific, and aesthetic categories. A system of 
power was developed through which relationships of gov-
ernance, labour, economy, and culture were forged. This sys-
tem of colonial racial differentiation set out Eurocentrism’s 
“fundamental axes” of a modern hierarchical system through 
which “historical identities” were created that discerned a 
“new global structure of the control of labor” associated with 
specific “social roles” and “geohistorical places.”34 While 
this “racial axis has a colonial origin and character, … it has 
proven to be more durable and stable than the colonialism in 
whose matrix it was established.”35 Relations of global trade, 
the organization of waged and unwaged labour, the divi-
sion of work, in short, the modes of production and social 
reproduction of global capitalism continue to be organized 
by the racial matrix sustaining the coloniality of power. The 
coloniality of power represents the cultural predicament of 
racial capitalism. Further, as Maria Lugones36 asserts, the 
racial differentiation system intersected with a patriarchal 
system, which became hegemonic in early modern times 
(thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) in Europe37 and was 
exported to the colonies from the fifteenth century onwards. 
This constituted the “coloniality of gender.” The coloniality 
of gender defines the universalization of a European cis-
gender dichotomy, which produced positions of masculine 
superiority and feminine inferiority. In the intersection with 
colonialism and racism, these categories are complicated, as 
when masculinity is racialized as black and brown, it is con-
sidered “animalistic” and, as such, violent and inferior. At 
the same time, femininity coupled with black or brown mas-
culinity can be considered inferior and an object of sexual-
ized exploitation and violence. Therefore, as Lugones argues, 
gender constitutes the matrix of the coloniality of power.38 
Negotiations around femininity and masculinity, as well as 
normative heterosexuality configure modern societies. Gen-
der plays a significant role in the interplay of racialization 
and global capitalism, fundamentally shaping the coloniality 
of power within asylum and migration policies.
Though not spelt out through the term coloniality, this 
understanding of the colonial condition and its social, 
political, and cultural persistence has been outlined by anti-
colonial thinkers such as W. E. B. du Bois,39 Eric Williams,40 
C. L. R. James,41 Claudia Jones,42 and Kwame Nkrumah43 
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in their analyses of European colonialism, pointing at rac-
isms as the shapers of modernity. As they demonstrate, the 
differentiation between citizen and non-citizen (alien and 
others)—which regulates access to the labour market, edu-
cation, political participation, the health system, media, 
and cultural representation—was established in colony and 
metropole alike. Thus racism was not just exported to the 
colonies but existed within the fabric of European socie-
ties prior to colonization.44 Racism is not an exception to 
European modernity but is at its very foundation.45 For Eric 
Williams, the transatlantic slave trade—the Maafa—fore-
grounds the entanglement between European modernity 
and the colonial plantation economy. It is in this entangle-
ment that migration emerges in the nineteenth century as a 
modern nation-state colonial tool of governing the popula-
tion in racial, ethnic, national, religious, and cultural terms.
Nineteenth-Century Settler Colonialism and 
European Transatlantic Migration
Considering Europe’s entangled global history, it is surpris-
ing that contemporary migratory movements are perceived 
in political and media discourses as external to Europe’s his-
tory and as singular phenomena. This has not always been 
the case. For example, in territories marked by a history of 
European colonialism, settler colonialism, and transatlantic 
migration, such as nation-states in the Americas, Australia,46 
Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa, transatlantic 
European migration has been foundational to the creation 
of these nation-states as countries of immigration. Defin-
ing themselves in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
as “countries of settlers and immigrants,” public discourses 
of these nation-states on national, cultural, and linguistic 
representation oscillated in the nineteenth century between 
negation or partial acknowledgement of the transcultural 
fabric of their societies, until today these national narratives 
silence the exploitation and dehumanization of the indig-
enous populations in these territories, ending in genocide in 
some cases. In Latin America the African presence47 due to 
the transatlantic slave trade during the sixteenth and nine-
teenth centuries has also been omitted from modern nation-
state building historiography.48 From the sixteenth to the 
nineteenth centuries approximately 13 million people from 
West and East Africa were enslaved and shipped to Europe 
and the Americas.49
In the twenty-first century, official historiographies and 
governments in these countries do not acknowledge the his-
tory, governments, political struggle, intellectual and artistic 
presence of the people who inhabited these territories before 
European colonization.50 Nonetheless, the presence of 
indigenous intellectuals, artists and activists challenging the 
white supremacist discourse of the Eurocentric narratives of 
“discovery” and “country of immigration” is more publicly 
present than ever.51 This same narrative disclosed the con-
tinuity between European colonialism and European trans-
atlantic migration. As Douglas Massey52 states, from 1500 to 
1800 world immigration patterns were defined by European 
colonialism. While Europe was establishing colonial rule 
in Africa and Asia, approximately 48 million emigrants 
left Europe for the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand 
between 1800 and 1925.53 The settlers arriving in the Ameri-
cas from Britain, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and 
Sweden represented part of modern colonization. This trans-
atlantic migration forms part of the modern European over-
seas colonial settlement project, coupled with ongoing settler 
colonialism in Oceania. Driven by the annexation of land, 
appropriation of raw materials, and subjugation of the indig-
enous population to pure exploitable labour, this project was 
also propelled by the economic boost produced through the 
transatlantic slave trade, enabling industrialization in Eng-
land, other parts of Europe, and the Americas. After the offi-
cial abolition of slavery in the Americas, indentured laborers 
were recruited from China54 and India to work in the rapidly 
expanding plantation industry from the late nineteenth to 
the early twentieth centuries, as well as impoverished, reli-
giously and politically persecuted Europeans.55
Though migration due to religious persecution, poverty, 
and epidemic menaces represents a consistent feature of 
European history, it was not until the late nineteenth cen-
tury that migration was centre stage in the regulation and 
control of the nation and its others. As a biopolitical tool of 
governance, migration policies were engineered and imple-
mented first in countries in transition from colonial rule to 
sovereign national power. The first modern migration poli-
cies were developed in the late nineteenth century in North, 
Central, and South America, and in parts of the Caribbean.56 
Guaranteeing the political, economic, and cultural influence 
of former colonial powers, migration policies established 
a set of instruments prioritizing the recruitment of white 
European migrants.57 This process took place in Canada, the 
United States, the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, and Latin 
America, or in territories kept in political dependency on the 
English Crown until the second half of the twentieth century, 
such as Australia58 and New Zealand.59
As a result of the expansion of transportation and the need 
for workers in rapidly expanding industries, nineteenth-
century white European transatlantic migration signalled 
the advent of racially structured capitalist progress, techno-
logical advancement and urbanization. The focus on racial 
capitalism60 constituted the nation-states’ rationale for the 
process of racialization in the recruitment of migrant labour 
and the selection of the migrant workforce via parameters 
of profit and efficacy in the former European colonies. The 
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recruitment of white European migrants was also deter-
mined by a cultural and educational project of nation build-
ing in the former European colonies. Here, the colonial 
discourse of Europe as the cradle of civilization, modernity, 
culture and progress underpinned the nation-state project.
The newly constituted sovereign nation-states in the 
Americas reacted to increasing immigration by establish-
ing policies banning certain social, national, religious, and 
racial groups from entry. For example, when Britain intro-
duced its first immigration service in 1827 to promote the 
emigration of Irish and poor people to Canada,61 the Nova 
Scotia Assembly reacted by establishing a bond system for 
the immigrants entering the country in 1828. The bond sys-
tem set a £10 tax on the master of any migrant vessel aiming 
to land on Canadian shores.62 If migrants did not become a 
burden for the Canadian state due to sickness, old age, pov-
erty, or immaturity, they would be refunded the bond within 
a year. The introduction of the bond system was preceded 
by discussions on race. In 1815 a group of black Bermudi-
ans entering Canada as British colonial subjects caused an 
uproar in the Nova Scotia Assembly, which complained to 
the English Crown about sending black people to Canada. 
The Assembly asked that they be repatriated and their fur-
ther migration be prevented.63 The question of race also 
became prominent in the further development of the head 
tax system. First introduced to control migration in general 
in 1828, it was also used as a tool to prevent the immigration 
of racialized bodies. In 1885, for example, the introduction 
of the Chinese head tax on Chinese immigrants deployed 
specific requirements in order to reduce their immigra-
tion. Chinese immigration was stopped altogether through 
the introduction of the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923.64 
From 1908 to 1947 the Continuous Journey legislation 
restricted Indian immigration by foreclosing their right as 
British colonial subjects to migrate to Canada. This had its 
more tragic moment in the Komagata Maru episode of 1914. 
A Japanese ship Komagata Maru, carrying 376 Punjabi pas-
sengers, coming from Hong Kong was not permitted to land 
in Vancouver and sent to Budge Budge near Kolkata, where 
they were fired at, detained, and kept under surveillance for 
years, as they were suspected of being political dissidents.65 
The Komagata Maru incident reflects the racial coding of 
Canada’s immigration policies at this time. The “Continuous 
Journey” regulation was introduced in 1908, two years after 
immigration legislation targeting non-white people and was 
further elaborated in 1910 by the corresponding Immigration 
Acts.66 Under these acts, the list of prohibited immigrants 
was expanded, and the Governor-in-Council (i.e., federal 
Cabinet) obtained greater authority in deciding on entry, 
settlement, and deportation measures. Further restrictions 
on entry permission were defined on the basis of race. For 
example, Asian immigrants were required to have $200 and 
Chinese immigrants $500 in their possession before being 
permitted entry, while white migrants were required to have 
a minimum of $25 upon their arrival.67 Thus the Continu-
ous Passage regulation was introduced in order to hinder the 
entry of non-European immigrants by permitting entry only 
to immigrants who came “from the country of their birth, 
or citizenship, by a continuous journey” and using tickets 
“purchased before leaving the country of their birth or citi-
zenship.” In the case of the Komagata Maru, its passengers 
coming from India could not make a straight journey to 
Vancouver because they needed to stop somewhere in order 
to be able to do the immense crossing. This stop was China. 
Further, Indian nationals that succeeded in making a con-
tinuous journey needed to pay the already mentioned entry 
tax of $200. The Komagata Maru event is emblematic for the 
racial coding of immigration laws in Canada, as it demon-
strates the deeply entrenched racism shaping immigration 
policies at this time.
In the 1870s the United States followed the Canadian entry 
tax system by passing legislation prohibiting certain groups 
of migrants from entering the country. In 1875, for example, 
Congress prohibited the entry of prostitutes, convicts, and 
persons with mental health issues or physical incapacities.68 
In 1891 the ban was expanded to persons suffering from con-
tagious diseases and allowed the deportation of migrants not 
complying with entry requirements. Some years later, such 
bio-political screening included the categories of race and 
nationality as selection criteria. Gerald L. Neuman69 asserts 
that the assumption that the United States of America was a 
country of free borders until the introduction of migration 
laws in 1875 is a myth. Also David Scott FitzGerald and David 
A. Cook-Martín70 concede that the United States had been 
one of the first nations to initiate racially coded naturaliza-
tion and migration policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. The introduction of the Naturalization Law in 
1790 reserved eligibility to naturalize to “free whites,” exclud-
ing the indigenous and enslaved population from citizenship. 
Further, at this time the first federal migrations laws were 
passed. The movement between the states in this region was 
already regulated by the English Crown and after independ-
ence by the United States itself in the form of incipient migra-
tion regulations. These migration regulations targeted poor 
and sick migrants, such as laws passed in Massachusetts in 
1794 penalizing “any person who knowingly brought a pauper 
or indigent person into any town in the Commonwealth”71 
or the masters of vessels bringing “unauthorized” colonial 
settlers. It was not until the beginning of the nineteenth 
century that a difference was established between “aliens” 
and “colonial settlers.” In 1831, laws passed in Massachusetts 
penalized the entry of “aliens” into US territory. Further, as 
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Neuman observes, the link between slavery and racism in 
the regulation of the movement of black people, fleeing from 
slavery and seeking political asylum in states that had abol-
ished slavery, is significant for how migration policies in the 
late nineteenth century would be racially coded. Already in 
the aftermath of the anti-colonial and anti-slavery rebellion 
in Saint Domingue in the early nineteenth century, black 
people coming to the United States were not only consid-
ered suspicious, as they were perceived as “free blacks,” but 
their revolutionary engagement was feared because of its 
potential to incite revolt against racism. In 1803 the South-
ern States of the United States obtained an “enactment of a 
federal statute prohibiting the importation of foreign blacks 
into states whose laws forbade their entry.”72 In the second 
half of the nineteenth century, migration regulations were 
explicitly guided by racial differentiation. For example, the 
U.S. government reacted to Chinese migration by passing 
the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882.73 This Act established 
a system of registration whereby all Chinese workers were 
obliged to register or face deportation. Though in the fol-
lowing years this Act was challenged by lawyers, restrictions 
on Chinese immigration were tightened throughout the 
next decades. Canada also passed a Chinese Immigration 
Act in 1885 introducing a head tax of fifty dollars on Chinese 
migrants. Eleven years later, Australia passed an Immigra-
tion Restriction Bill to prevent access by Southeast Asian 
immigrants, followed by a “White Australian Policy” in 1904, 
which banned immigration from South Asia, particularly 
from India, as well as from Africa.74 This policy continued 
into the second half of the twentieth century.
Tanya Ketarí Hernández75 notes, “Debates over immi-
gration policies in Spanish America were often couched in 
racial language.” At the beginning of the nineteenth century 
the Congress of Gran Colombia (constituting what is now 
Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela) promoted 
settler colonialism by granting land to European migrants. 
Brazil and Argentina followed suit and prioritized European 
migration in their constitutions, arguing that this would be 
beneficial for technological and economic progress. Argen-
tina actively promoted and sought European immigration 
after the emancipation of the enslaved population in 1853. 
Between 1869 and 1895 the European population in Argen-
tina increased from 1.8 million to 4 million, and in 1914 it 
was 7.9 million, 30 per cent of the population.76 This increase 
was not a coincidence but resulted from a concerted effort 
by the Argentine government to recruit European workers 
and gift land, as well as partially cover the cost of transpor-
tation of white European migrants in the early years. Simi-
lar developments took place in Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay, 
where together with Argentina, 90 per cent of the 10–11 mil-
lion European migrants who arrived between 1880 and 1930 
settled. In Venezuela, after the emancipation of the enslaved 
population in 1854, the government’s interest in white 
European migration was confirmed within public intellec-
tual debates around the blanqueamiento (whitening) of the 
nation.77 Through the biological metaphor of “transfusion 
of blood” the Venezuelan government recruited migrants 
from Ireland, Gran Canaria, Germany, and Italy to keep the 
nation white. In 1891 legislation was passed preventing non-
white migrants from entering the country. This policy was 
integrated in the 1906 constitution, which explicitly prohib-
ited any African-descendent immigration. In a similar vein, 
in 1890 Brazil instituted Decree No. 528, which excluded all 
migrants from Africa and Asia from entering the country. 
This decree instituted the primacy of whiteness and dispos-
sessed the inhabitants of Abya Yala78 from their entitlement 
to land they had inhabited for centuries, as the migrants 
arriving mainly from Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Germany 
were thought to legally own and settle in individual allot-
ments of this territory. Brazil states in its 1853 constitution, 
“The federal government shall foster European immigration, 
and may not restrict, limit or burden with any tax whatso-
ever, the entry.”79 In 1921 Brazil’s Federal Law prohibited the 
entry of “undesirables.”80 This legal regulation was factually 
executed, when Brazil rejected the settlement of a group of 
African-Americans who were planning to create a settler 
colony in Mato Grosso.81 Legislation preventing particularly 
Chinese and non-European immigration was also passed in 
other parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. In Haiti, 
legislation forbidding the entry of Syrian immigrants was 
introduced in 1903.82 Similar laws banning Armenians 
and Syrians were also passed in Costa Rica (1914), Panama 
(1909–17), and Venezuela (1919).83 Europe expanded its eco-
nomic, political, legal, and cultural control over colonized 
territories overseas through settler colonialism-migration 
until the middle of the twentieth century. However, in the 
public discourse in Europe this white European transatlan-
tic settler colonial-migration seems to have been forgotten. 
Instead, migration is considered a new issue appearing in 
post-1945 societies or brought by post-1970s globalization to 
Europe. Within this context, migration is constructed as not 
having any roots in Europe, and Europe itself as the epicen-
tre of global immigration.
EU Asylum-Migration Regime and Racial 
Differentiation
In the late 1940s and 1950s citizens of English colonies in 
the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent arrived in the 
United Kingdom. These British citizens were seen as exterior 
to the nation and constructed as immigrants. In France in 
the 1950s a similar situation occurred when citizens from 
the French North African colonies arrived in the hexagone 
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(France). The presence of these (former) colonial subjects in 
the seat of empire challenged the public myth that European 
nation-states were cut off from the circuits of colonialism 
and imperialism. In the 1960s and 1970s labour migra-
tion shaped the Fordist state in Germany, France, Britain, 
the Netherlands, and the Benelux countries, through the 
recruitment of workers from the disenfranchised territories 
of Southern Europe, Turkey, Morocco, and (post-)colonial 
territories. Despite these migratory movements, Europe’s 
memory about its own history of transatlantic settler colo-
nialism-migration and exile was not brought to the fore. 
Nonetheless, the 1980s reaffirmed that the movements of 
people due to political persecution, poverty, war, austerity, 
social constraints, cultural restrictions, lack of employment, 
study, leisure, or just because of their wish for change, con-
stituted the fabric of current societies. It is within this (post-)
colonial context that migration and border control measures, 
technologies, devices, and tropes have been engineered in 
the last three decades.
Migration regulation ensures that the Other of the nation/
Europe/the Occident is reconfigured in racial terms. The 
logic generated in this context constructs and produces 
objects to be governed through restrictions, management 
devices, and administrative categories such as “refugee,” 
“asylum seeker,” or a variety of migrant statuses. The colonial-
ity of migration operates within this matrix of social clas-
sification on the basis of colonial racial hierarchies. Colonial 
difference departs from the idea that the colonized popula-
tion is fundamentally different and inherently inferior to the 
colonizer.84 It conceives the Other as radically inassimilable, 
oscillating between the positions of strangeness and similari-
ty.85 Migration policies reiterate such racialized objectifica-
tion reminiscent of colonial times.
While current EU migration and asylum policies do not 
operate explicitly within a framework of racial or ethnic 
difference, by coupling nationality and the right to asylum, 
they construct hierarchies in the recognition or rejection of 
asylum in terms of nationalities. This places people in zones 
of recognition or rejection of the human right to liveabili-
ty.86 This coupling follows from the foundation of racialized 
notions of the Other. While the entry of Syrian refugees 
to Germany was being accepted in the autumn of 2015, for 
instance, people from Kosovo, Albania, and Montenegro 
were being deported. On October 24, 2015, these latter coun-
tries were declared “safe countries of origin.” However, those 
affected by these deportations were primarily Roma families 
who had fled from racist violence in their countries of origin. 
The perception and categorization of this group was deter-
mined in Germany not only by their national origin. As the 
result of Western European racism against Roma and Sinti, 
deeply rooted since the Middle Ages and articulated anew, 
they have become the objects of securitization measures.87
Further, as previously argued, the discourses on the “refu-
gee crisis” operate within the duality of self and Other. The 
debate on the “refugee crisis” is determined either by the 
humanitarian perspective or by a regulatory approach. The 
humanitarian perspective emphasizes the need for wealthy 
nations to provide support for people fleeing from wars 
and conflict zones. It appeals to Christian and humanitar-
ian traditions of charity and empathy. Instead, the regula-
tory approach argues for the prioritization of securing the 
wealth of the local population. This debate is taking place 
across all political party ideologies in countries with a strong 
welfare regime, such as in Western Europe, the Scandinavian 
countries, the Netherlands, France, and Germany. If we take 
Germany, for example, we see how the argument about the 
limits of the welfare state in providing support for refugees 
is debated by very different political actors. While there are, 
of course, ideological and policy-related differences between 
the political camps, it is surprising to see how they converge 
in the use of the figure of the refugee as the Other of the 
nation, or Europe’s “exteriority.”88 However, the migration-
asylum nexus does not only follow the logic of the produc-
tion of a racialized exteriority to the nationally imagined and 
proclaimed norm of European whiteness. This nexus also 
operates within the dynamics of exploitation that have func-
tioned for the last five centuries within the colonial-modern 
world system, and particularly within the context of nation-
state migration policies since the nineteenth century.
Conclusion: Racial Capitalism
After the summer of migration in 2015, Europe turned to 
an autumn of racism. Events like the 2015 New Year’s Eve 
media controversy about claims that North African men 
had “raped” women at the train station in Cologne, as I have 
already mentioned, represented this turning point. After 
being disciplined by Media Watch in the last decade, the 
German media felt it could openly voice its racism, report-
ing in racist terms on “North African men,” mobilizing the 
stereotype of the black/brown man as rapist and the white 
national woman as victim. Supposedly in fear of the rac-
ist white supremacist mob taking over, politicians quickly 
instituted new deportation laws and migration restrictions 
for citizens with Moroccan, Tunisian, or Algerian passports. 
The public outcry combined with other racist articulations 
and attacks against refugees in Germany, Hungary, Poland, 
and Sweden and the EU refusal to offer asylum drove poli-
ticians in Germany to pass a second asylum law packet, 
restricting family reunification for two years for subsidiary 
refugees. On the eve of discussions regarding the building of 
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a coalition government in Germany in the winter of 2017/18, 
the restriction of family reunification for refugees and the 
deportation of Afghan refugees was again tabled.
The “refugee crisis” reveals the paradoxes in which migra-
tion evolves. Migration within the emergence of the modern 
nation-state in the nineteenth century in former European 
colonies illustrates the divide created between the insider 
and outsider of the nation. This divide evokes the logic of 
coloniality, as it creates a racial difference between the insid-
ers, considered members of the nation, and the outsiders, 
considered “migrants.” Thus the dichotomy between citizens 
and migrants is embedded in a racializing logic produced 
within social relations shaped by the enduring effects of 
colonial epistemic power. It is in this regard that I have pro-
posed the framework of the coloniality of migration in order 
to analyze migration policies.
As we have seen here, the coupling of productivity, migra-
tion, and racism marked the rise of migration policies in the 
Americas and Oceania. The recruitment of migrant workers 
took place within European racial notions of sameness and 
strangeness. Up until the mid-twentieth century, countries 
like the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Canada explicitly recruited white Europeans. 
These policies represented a continuation of settler coloni-
alism through the implementation of European immigra-
tion policies. These immigration policies were coupled to 
the project of nation-state building with migrants thought 
and imagined as white Europeans. As such, countries such 
as Canada, the United States, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Chile, and New Zealand, to name a few, were attempting to 
create extensions of a white Christian Europe. For example, 
in Argentina and Brazil the recruitment of white European 
migrants was officially legitimized as a means for national 
industrial achievement, technical progress and urban indus-
trialisation.89 Yet, despite the restrictions applied to migra-
tion movements from non-European territories, people 
from the Middle East, North Africa, China, and the Carib-
bean still immigrated to these areas, although attempts were 
regularly undertaken to stop them.90
As I have argued here, the link between racial capital-
ism and coloniality is significant for migration policies in 
Western Europe. Though Europe imagines itself as “raceless,” 
it is the cradle of the invention of racial capitalism. Migra-
tion policies operate within this racializing logic, not only 
on the level of the organization of labour recruitment, but 
also through border and migration control technologies.91 
For example, migration policies in the United Kingdom for 
Commonwealth citizens have operated within a range of 
restrictions, limiting or preventing the entry of these citizens 
to Britain by treating former colonial subjects of the British 
Empire as exterior to the British nation.92 Here coloniality 
Notes
 1 I would like to thank the guest editors, editors, and 
anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. 
A very special thanks goes also to Shirley Anne Tate.
 2 No evidence has been given on what happened on that 
night. The media spectacle produced its own figures and 
facts, circulating them widely in social media. For fur-
ther discussion, see Beverly Weber, “‘We must talk about 
Cologne’: Race, Gender, and Reconfigurations of ‘Europe,’” 
German Politics and Society 34, no. 4 (Winter 2016): 68–86; 
and Zuher Jazmati and Nina Studer, “Racializing ‘Oriental’ 
Manliness: From Colonial Contexts to Cologne,” Islamo-
phobia Studies Journal 4, no. 1 (Fall 2017): 87–100.
 3 Stuart Hall introduces the analysis of the “conjuncture of 
racism” in his discussion of Antonio Gramsci in his article 
“Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity,” 
Journal of Communication Inquiry 10, no. 5 (1986): 5–27.
is played out by racializing this population and creating 
individuals with partial rights to no rights to entry and set-
tlement in the United Kingdom. Also the “guest-worker” 
programs in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, intended to 
temporarily recruit workers from Southern Europe, Turkey, 
Tunisia, and Morocco, converted people to interchangeable 
items within labour market demands.
In the current asylum-migration nexus, the “refugee” has 
been reduced to a potential worker. Asylum policies seem 
to be turning into a new way of regulating and controlling 
racialized labour migration. One of the measures that were 
agreed in the German parliament across all party lines was 
the introduction of “1-euro jobs for refugees” in June 2016.93 
This measure was intended to initially create jobs for the 
100,000 people who had arrived in Germany as refugees. 
The German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that 
these people received only eighty cents per hour, because the 
costs for travel and work clothes were deducted. Here, too, 
recommendations from the International Labour Organi-
sation for working standards were ignored for those given 
asylum. These forms of utilization recall Enrique Dussel’s94 
“objectification” of the indigenous and Afro-descendent 
populations during the Portuguese and Spanish colonization 
of the Americas. Dussel describes this process as a form of 
“thing-ification” of the labour force. Migration policies tend 
to neglect the fact that “Es wurden Arbeiter gerufen und es 
kamen Menschen an” (They called for workers, but human 
beings came), as the Turkish singer Cem Karaca95 sang in the 
1980s. The coloniality of migration draws attention to this 
fact by addressing the links between labour, capitalism, and 
racism. Thus, the asylum-migration nexus needs to be inter-
rogated as an object of governance through racial/ethnic and 
gender differentiation, as a cultural script for understanding 
society and as another grammar of thinking through capital.
Volume 34 Refuge Number 1
26
 4 See Suivi Keskinen, “The ‘Crisis’ of White Hegem-
ony, Neonationalist Femininities and Antiractist Fem-
inism,” Women’s Studies International Forum (2018), 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/
S0277539517301784. 
 5 For further discussion on the “crisis of white hegemony,” 
see “Feminisms in Times of Anti-Genderism, Racism and 
Austerity,” ed. Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Pinar 
Tuzcu, and Heidemarie Winkel, special issue, Women’s 
Studies International Forum (2018).
 6 Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and 
Brian Roberts introduce this term in their analysis of the 
rhetoric of crisis at the early stages of Thatcherism; see Poli-
cing the Crisis (London: MacMillan, 1978).
 7 See Hall, “Gramsci’s Relevance.”
 8 Stephen Castles discusses the “asylum-migration nexus” in 
his “Global Perspectives on Forced Migration,” Asian and 
Pacific Migration Journal 15 (2006): 17–28.
 9 See Anibal Quijano’s discussion in “Colonialidad del Poder, 
Eurocentrismo y América Latina,” International Sociology 
 15, no. 2 (2000): 201−46; and Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, 
Eurocentrism, and Social Classification,” Coloniality at 
Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate, ed. M. 
Moraña, E. D. Dussel, and C. A. Jáuregui, 181–224 (Dur-
ham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).
 10 This term has been introduced by Cedric Robinson in Black 
Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (1983), 
I referred with this term also to W. E .B. Du Bois’s, Claudia 
Jones, Angela Davis, Enrique Dussel, and Anibal Quijano’s 
analysis of the relationship between capitalism and racism.
 11 See “Statistiken,” UNHCR Deutschland, http://www.unhcr 
.org/dach/de/services/statistiken.
 12 The UNHCR statistics on persons of concern, which 
includes refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced 
people, and others, shows a figure of 1.27 million per-
sons of concern in Germany by the end of 2016. This fig-
ure is composed of 669,482 people registered as refugees, 
587,346 registered as asylum seekers, and 12,017 regis-
tered as stateless persons. See http://popstats.unhcr.org/
en/overview#_ga=2.160857659.727621022.1514460020–
952709227.1514460020.
 13 This is a category introduced by UNHCR including refugees, 
asylum seekers, and internally displaced people.
 14 See http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview#_ga= 
2.160857659.727621022.1514460020–952709227.1514460020.
15 See “UNHCR Statistics,” http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/
overview#_ga=2.160857659.727621022.1514460020–
952709227.1514460020, accessed December 12, 2017.
 16 Hall et al. introduce this term in their analysis of the rhet-
oric of crisis at the early stages of Thatcherism; see Policing 
the Crisis.
 17 See Myrto Tsilimpounidi, Sociology of Crisis: Visualising 
Urban Austerity (London: Routledge, 2017), 11.
 18 Tsilimpounidi, Sociology of Crisis, 12.
 19 “Political persecution” refers to persecutions related to sex-
ualized, religious, and other forms of violence that threat-
ens and damages the integrity of a person’s life.
 20 I discuss this aspect in Migration, Domestic Work and Affect 
(New York: Routledge, 2010).
 21 See Castles, “Global Perspectives.”
 22 See “Comunicación de la Comisión al Parlamento Europeo, 
al Consejo, al Comité Económico y Social Europeo y al 
Comité de las Regiones,” EUR-Lex, http://eur-lex.europa 
eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/?uri=celex:52008DC0360.
 23 See Antonio Negri, Cinque lezioni di metodo su Multitudine 
e Impero (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino Editore, 2003).
 24 This principle, rhetorically connecting to the idea of “bel-
lum iustum [the ‘just war’], combines two elements: the 
legitimacy of the military apparatus as ethically grounded—
think of the human rights discourse against rogue states—
and the legitimacy (qua its effectiveness) of the military 
action to establish the desired Other and the so-called 
peace” (Negri, Cinque lezioni, 25).
 25 For further discussion, see Negri, Cinque lezioni.
 26 Thomas Atzert and Jost Müller, eds., Antonio Negri: Kritik 
der Weltordnung: Globalisierung, Imperialismus, Empire 
(Berlin: ID Verlag, 2003), 136.
 27 I develop this discussion in Migration, Domestic Work and 
Affect.
 28 See Anibal Quijano and Michael Ennis, “Coloniality of 
Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” Nepantla: Views 
from South 1, no. 3 (2000): 570. 
 29 See here W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America 
(1935; repr., New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
 30 Du Bois’s analysis relates to industrial societies, but pro-
cesses of racialization already took place before and dur-
ing colonialization, such as the introduction of laws for 
the persecution of Roma, Jewish, and Muslim populations 
in the Spanish kingdom in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
century.
 31 For further discussion, see Robert Bernasconi and Syboll 
Coole, eds., Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).
 32 For further discussion, see Francisco Bethencourt, Racism: 
From the Crusades to the Twentieth Century (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2014).
 33 See Quijano, “Coloniality of Power.”
 34 See Quijano, “Colonialidad del Poder,” 533–6.
 35 See Quijano, “Colonialidad del Poder,” 534.
 36 See María Lugones, “The Coloniality of Gender,” Worlds & 
Knowledges Otherwise 2 (Spring 2008): 1–17.
 37 For further discussion on the establishment of a capitalist 
system operating on the divide between production and 
reproduction organized through a patriarchal system, see 
Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body 
and Primitive Accumulation (San Francisco: Autonomedia, 
2004).
 38 For further critical discussion on the coloniality of gender, 
see, for example, Ifi Amadiume, Male Daughters, Female 
Volume 34 Refuge Number 1
27
Husbands: Gender and Sex in a African Society (1987; 
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015); and Yuderkys 
Espinosa Muñoz, “Hacia la construcción de la historia 
de un (des)encuentro: La razón feminista y la agencia y 
la agencia antirracista y decolonial en Abya Yala,” Praxis: 
Revista de Filosofía 76 (2017): 25–39.
 39 See Du Bois, Black Reconstruction.
 40 See Eric Eustace Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).
 41 See C. L. R James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint Louverture 
and the San Domingo Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 
1989).
 42 See the wonderful recollection of Claudia Jones’s work 
edited by Carole Boyce Davies, Claudia Jones: Beyond 
Cotainment (Oxfordshire: Ayebia Clarke Publishing, 2011).
 43 See Kwame Nkrumah, Class Struggle in Africa (New York: 
International Publishers, 2006).
 44 For futher discussion, see Miriam Eliav-Felden, Benjamin 
Isaac, and Joseph Ziegler, eds., The Origins of Racism in the 
West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
 45 These authors deployed here develop a similar argument 
to Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno in regard to 
the analysis of anti-Semitism. As they argue, anti-Semitism 
represents the underside of modern Enlightenment.
 46 See discussion in James Jupp, From White Australia to 
Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002).
 47 Stuart Hall discusses the presence Africaine in “Creolité 
and the Process of Creolization,” in Creolizing Europe: Leg-
acies and Transformations, ed. Encarnación Gutiérrez Rod-
ríguez and Shirley Tate, 12–25 (2003; Liverpoool: University 
of Liverpool Press, 2015).
 48 For further discussion, see Goerge Reid Andrews, Afro-
Latin America, 1800–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004).
 49 For further discussion, see David Eltis and David Rich-
ardson, eds., Extending the Frontiers: Essays on the New 
Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2008)
 50 For further discussion, see Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, 
White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014); and 
Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life across 
the Border of Settler States (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2014).
 51 See, for example, critique from the political theorist Gladys 
Tzul Tzul, “Mujere indígenas: Historias de la reproducción 
de la vida en Guatemala,” Bajo el Volcán 15, no. 2 (2015): 
91–9; and in the Canadian context the critique by Eve Tuck 
and K. Wayne Young, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor,” 
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 1, no. 1 
(2012): 1–40.
 52 See Douglas S. Massey, “The Social and Economic Origins 
of Immigration,” Annals of the American Academy of Polit-
ical and Social Sciences 510 (2000): 60–72.
 53 See Massey, “Social and Economic Origins of Immigration,” 
62.
 54 See discussion by Lisa Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Contin-
ents (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015).
 55 For example, see discussion on Caribbean racism by Shir-
ley Anne Tate and Ian Law, Caribbean Racisms: Connec-
tions and Complexities in the Racialization of the Caribbean 
Region (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
 56 For further discussion on Latin America, see, for example, 
Jeffrey Lesser, Immigration, Ethnicity, and National Identity 
in Brazil, 1808 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2013); and David S. FitzGerald and David A. 
Cook-Martín, Culling the Masses: The Democratic Origins 
of Racist Immigration Policies in the Americas (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).
 57 See discussion in Tanya Katerí Hernández, Racial Subordin-
ation in Latin America: The Role of the State, Custormary 
Law, and the New Civil Rights Response (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2013).
 58 While Australia gained independence from the British 
Crown in 1931, Britain’s power remained, as the Queen 
was responsible for appointing state governors and giving 
assent to state bills. This changed through the introduction 
of the Australian Act in 1986, which stated that the British 
government was no longer responsible for the government 
of any state and that the Westminster Parliament could no 
longer legislate for Australia.
 59 The 1852 New Zealand Constitution Act granted the col-
ony’s settlers the right to self-government. Yet New Zea-
land did not become a sovereign nation-state until 1919, 
though, like Australia, political ties to the Queen remain 
significant.
 60 I refer here to discussions in du Bois, Black Reconstruction 
in America; and Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The 
Making of the Black Radical Tradition (Chapel Hill: Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 2000).
 61 See Richard Plender, International Migration Law (Dor-
drecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988).
 62 Plender, International Migration Law.
 63 Plender, International Migration Law, 67.
 64 See discussion in Valerie Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates: 
Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540–1997 
(Toronto: Dundurn, 1997).
 65 For further discussion, see Anjali Gera Roy and Ajaya 
K. Sahoo, “The Journey of the Komagata Maru: National, 
Transnational, Diasporic,” South Asian Diaspora 8, no. 2 
(2016): 85–97.
 66 See Ninette Kelley and Michael Trebilcok, The Making 
of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).
 67 Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates, 86.
 68 Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates.
 69 See Gerald Neuman, “The Lost Century of American 
Immigration Law (1776–1875),” Columbia Law Review 
Association 93, no. 8 (1993): 1833–1901.
Volume 34 Refuge Number 1
28
 70 See David S. FitzGerald and David A. Cook-Martín, Cull-
ing the Masses: The Democratic Origins of Racist Immigra-
tion Policies in the Americas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2014).
 71 See Neuman, “Lost Century of American Immigration 
Law,” 1849.
 72 Neuman, “Lost Century of American Immigration Law,” 
1869.
 73 Plender, International Migration Law, 69.
 74 Plender, International Migration Law, 69.
 75 Katerí Hernández, Racial Subordination in Latin America, 
23.
 76 Katerí Hernández, Racial Subordination in Latin America, 
23.
 77 Katerí Hernández, Racial Subordination in Latin America, 
27.
 78 Abya Yala is the term that the World Council of the Indigen-
ous Nations has opted to use for this continent. Yala in the 
Kuna language means “land, territory,” Abya means “whole 
of blood,” “maternal maturity,” “virgin maturity,” and “land 
in its full maturity.”
 79 Katerí Hernández, Racial Subordination in Latin America, 
24.
 80 See discussion in Lesser, Negotiating National Identity.
 81 See discussion in FitzGerald and Cook-Martín, Culling the 
Masses.
 82 Plender, International Migration Law, 69.
 83 Plender, International Migration Law, 70.
 84 See discussion in Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its 
Fragments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); 
and George Steinmetz, “‘The Devil’s Handwriting’: Precol-
onial Discourse, Ethnographic Acuity, and Cross-Identi-
fication in German Colonialism,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 45, no. 1 (2003): 41–95.
 85 Stuart Hall analyzes this dynamic in Representation: Cul-
tural Representation and Signifying Practices, edited by 
Stuart Hall, Jessica Evans and Sean Nixon (London: Sage, 
1997).
 86 See discussion in Lorraine Pannett, Making a Livable Life in 
Manchester: Doing Justice to People Seeking Asylum (Man-
chester: Manchester University Press, 2011).
 87  For further discussion, see Ana Nichita Ivasiuc, Provincial-
izing Citizenship: Critical Anthropological Notes on the Uses 
and Usefullness of “Citizenship” in the Context of the Roma 
Political Subject. https://www.academia.edu/11754903/
Provincialising_Citizenship._Critical_anthropological_
notes_on_the_uses_and_usefulness_of_citizenship_in_
the_context_of_the_Roma_political_subject.
 88 I draw here on Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Amer-
icas: Eclipse of the Other and the Myth of Modernity (New 
York: Continuum, 1995).
 89 I share this observation with Lourdes Martinez-Echazabal 
in “Discourse of National/Cultural Identity in Latin Amer-
ica, 1845–1959,” Latin American Perspectives 25, no. 3 (1998): 
21–42.
 90 This aspect is further discussed in Elena Fiddian-Qasmi-
yeh, “Embracing Transculturalism and Footnoting Islam 
in Accounts of Arab Migration to Cuba,” Interventions: 
International Journal of Postcolonial Studies 18, no. 1 (2016): 
19–42. 
 91 For further discussion, see Amade, M’charek, Katharina 
Schramm, and David Skinner, “Topologies of Race: Doing 
Territory, Population and Identity in Europe,” Science, 
Technology & Human Values 39, no. 4 (2014): 468–87.
 92 In this regard, see discussion in John Solomos, Race and 
Racism in Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003).
 93 See Thomas Öchsner, “Ein-Euro-Jobs für Flüchtlinge sind 
nur 80-Cents-Jobs,” Süddeutsche Zeitung 10, no. 6 (2016), 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/fluechtlinge- 
ein-euro-jobs-fuer-fluechtlinge-sind-nur-cent-jobs-1 
.3027433.
 94 See Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse 
of the Other and the Myth of Modernity (New York: Con-
tinuum, 1995).
 95 See Cem Karaca, “Es kamen Menschen an” [Human 
beings arrived] in “Songs of Gastarbeiter,” vol. 1, Imran 
Ayata and Bülent Kullukca, 2013, https://trikont.de/
shop/themen/turkische-musik-turkish-sounds/songs-of- 
gastarbeiter-vol-1/.
Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez is professor in sociology at 
the Justust-Liebig-University, Giessen. She may be reached at 
E.Gutierrez-Rodriguez@sowi.uni-giessen.de.
